Introduction
Conflict is endemic to humanity. The principal motives for conflict remain, as Thucydides observed during the Peloponnesian War over two thousand years ago, fear, interest, and honor.
1 It can be argued that this triad of core motives captures the underlying causal factors present in most belligerent contests. While more than one of these motives may be at work in any given conflict, a single motive can and often does outweigh the others. This primary motive must be identified and addressed to truly resolve the conflict in question. Culture influences the magnitude of the motives and thus provides a lens through which to discern the motives at work. A potential solution emerges once it is known whether the positions in conflict are taken predominantly out of fear, interest, or honor. If interests can be identified, then they can be appeased.
Fears, once recognized, can be eased. However, honor, once besmirched, is not easily assuaged.
This examination contends that honor, the most difficult of the three motives to accurately assess and adequately address, frequently outweighs fear and interest in the prolongation of human conflict. As Richard Lebow, drawing from ancient and modern philosophy, concludes in his ambitious theoretical departure entitled A Cultural Theory for International Relations:
The active pursuit of honor and standing by individuals and states is often costly… Foolhardy feats in battle, accepting war under unfavorable circumstances or building battle fleets that needlessly provoke a conflict with another major power indicate that honor and standing are not infrequently pursued at significant cost to security. 2 Honor, a primal code of human behavior, plays a powerful role in war and, therefore, has a pivotal role to play in peace.
With the three paradigms of international relations theory as foundation and
Lebow"s underappreciated departure as inspiration, this study seeks to advance the Thucydidean triad as a basis for analyzing conflict. It begins with the realist view and the role of fear in violent clashes. Next, it adds the liberalist view and interest as a core motive underlying conflict and cooperation. It then overlays the constructivist view of the world, highlighting the significance of culture and the centrality of honor in the continuation of conflict. Having described the motives, the study distills the fear-interesthonor triad into a security-prosperity-identity framework for analyzing conflict. It then applies this analytic framework to three of the world"s most intractable conflicts-IsraelPalestine, India-Pakistan, and China-Taiwan-to discover the weight of the motives presently at work. Drawing conclusions from the findings, the study offers recommendations for analyzing and resolving such conflicts.
Fear, Interest, and Honor
Though character and conduct vary, there are discernable constants in war.
Beginning with the ancient Greeks, historians and philosophers uncovered these constants for posterity. Whether to preserve experience, prescribe method, or promote thought, the contributions of Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Kant and others offer penetrating insight into the saga of human conflict and cooperation. Such works stand the test of time and inform modern international relations theory chiefly because the underlying motives of individual human behavior, as originally described by the Greeks and amplified by others, are the underlying motives of collective human or state behavior. In other words, the behavior of states, as human constructs, reflects the behavior of humans.
While Thucydides is considered the father of realism, all three prominent theories of international relations-realism, liberalism, and constructivism-are eloquently reflected in his above-stated triad of Athenian motives. In the anarchical system of realism, security (fear) is a primary motive for competition between state actors. In the interdependent system of liberalism, prosperity (interest) is a primary motive for cooperation between state and supra-state actors. In the ideational system of constructivism, identity (honor) is a primary motive for competition and cooperation between both state and non-state actors. All three schools of thought have merit.
Moreover, all three are consistent with the introductory epigram and the analytical framework advanced by this study. This section of the study examines and applies realism, liberalism, and constructivism in successive layers to highlight the salience and significance of security, prosperity, and identity as underlying motives in the behavior of states in conflict. These motives, it may be surmised, are derived from the physical, material, and social needs that shape the behavior of actors at all levels.
Realism and Fear. In the profoundly influential book on political thought, Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes asserts, "Out of civil states, there is always war of every one against every one." 3 According to Hobbes, the competitive nature of man predisposes him to war. 4 Focusing on man"s immutable nature, the realists, led by Morgenthau, view states as unitary actors aggressively competing against one another for power in an anarchical environment. 5 Neorealists redefined this competition as one for security. According to neorealist theory, the ultimate concern of states is not power but security. 6 In this arena, physical survival is the overriding imperative, and psychological fear is the underlying motive. An action by one state to make itself more secure makes others less secure. Fearing the one, the others then take steps to make themselves more secure. In this security dilemma, the actions taken to increase security may make all parties less secure. 8 In such an environment, fear or apprehension (deos) abounds. 9 According to Waltz, "Preoccupation with identifying dangers and counteracting them become a way of life. Relations are tense; the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile even though by nature they may not be given to suspicion and hostility." 10 In the case of the Peloponnesian War, the growth of Athens" power caused fear in the Sparta-led Peloponnesian League. According to Thucydides, "The growth of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable." 11 The two powers were caught in a security dilemma. fourth motive, begins to govern behavior. 19 While Lebow"s painstaking work informs this examination, the focus of this study is on conflict rather than cooperation. Fear, interest, and honor, rather than reason, dictate the behavior of actors in conflict.
Lebow gives special emphasis to the impact of honor on individual and state behavior because, as he attests, "the motive is more or less ignored by political science." 20 In addition to being ignored, special emphasis is placed on it here because honor often outweighs the other motives in the instigation, prolongation, and, moreover, the termination of conflict. Drawing on the writings of Homer and Thucydides, Lebow develops an ideal-type honor-based society. 21 Homer"s Iliad played a central role in ancient Greek education and the development of Greek values. 22 Lebow characterizes the ancient Greeks as a society based largely on honor.
Lebow writes, "The Greeks were fed Homer with their mother"s milk, and nowhere was the diet so rich as in Sparta, where respect for the past and its values was actively fostered by the state." 23 Given the premise of the present study, his description of such societies is instructive and warrants restating in full:
In honor-based societies, honor cannot be attained without risk, so leaders and followers alike welcome the opportunity to risk limbs and lives to gain or defend it. Risk-taking will be extended to the defense of material possessions. Risk-taking actors will also defend their autonomy at almost any cost because it is so closely linked to honor, unless they can find some justification for disaggregating it from honor that is convincing to themselves and their peers. Honor appears to have outweighed fear and interest in Sparta"s decision to declare war on Athens. Athens and Corinth, an ally of Sparta, were engaged in a conflict over Corinth"s colony at Potidaea. The Corinthians blamed Athens" aggressive actions on Sparta"s passive inaction. 25 The Corinthians charged their allies, the Spartans, with failing to stand with them against the escalating Athenian hostility. 26 Corinth questioned Sparta"s commitment to the alliance and by doing so questioned Sparta"s honor. In light of these accusations, failing to come to the aid of its ally would have been highly dishonorable. 27 Athens" belligerent behavior was perceived as an affront to Sparta"s dignity. Lebow concludes that "The Spartan decision for war was not motivated by concern for physical security but by ontological security: the need to defend Spartan values and identity. 28 This motive is not unique to the Spartans. As others note, honor and its opposite, shame, are inseparable from the human condition. 29 These opposing poles exert a powerful force on human behavior yet are largely undervalued in examining the behavior of states.
Honor, which Lebow equates with the spirit, "is the universal human need for self-esteem." 30 Self-esteem is closely related to identity. Identity, a social psychology term, refers to the distinctive image of self held and projected by an actor. 31 It is formed over time through interactions with others and reflects the culture of the actor"s environment. 32 Identity, although gaining credibility, is perhaps the least understood and most underrated stimulus considered by contemporary international relations theorists.
Three principal catalysts may be deduced from the major paradigms of international relations theory: security, prosperity, and identity. These three catalysts correspond to the constants-fear, interest, and honor-originally articulated by Thucydides. In employing Thucydides" elegant triad and endorsing Lebow"s exceptional theory, this essay seeks to underscore the importance of fear, interest, and, above all, honor as motives for conflict. The following section converts the fear-interest-honor triad into a security-prosperity-identity framework for assessing the behavior of states in conflict.
The Triad as a Framework
Concise definitions are useful for constructing a practical framework. In the framework put forth here, the triad of motives described above forms the basis of a state"s actions. To sum, three types of innate human needs-physical, material, and social-drive individual and collective behavior. The state, as a collective human construct, is driven largely by its security, prosperity, and identity needs. Consequently, the behavior of the state, can be characterized as fear-, interest-, or honor-based.
Actions taken to maintain or enhance security are fear-based actions; actions intended to maintain or enhance prosperity are interest-based actions; actions taken to maintain or enhance identity are honor-based actions. 33 A single action may, however, serve more than one motive and satisfy more than one goal. Nevertheless, a single motive can and often does outweigh the others.
Accurately identifying this motive, while key to understanding the conflict in question, can be difficult to do. Most scholars, including Thucydides, believe Sparta"s decision to declare war on Athens was motivated by fear. 34 Yet, as Lebow deftly demonstrates, the proximate cause of Sparta"s decision to attack Athens was Corinth"s scathing rebuke. 35 Sparta, as leader of the Peloponnesian League, was compelled less by fear than by honor. Sparta, with its renowned military prowess, was expected to defend the league. As previously established, Sparta"s identity was threatened. 36 To be sure, perceived threats to identity can outweigh real threats to either security or prosperity. In the next section, this hypothesis is applied to three of the modern world"s most enduring conflicts-Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, and China-Taiwan-to determine whether these seemingly irresolvable disputes are driven, today, control. 39 Israel would comprise approximately 55% of the land; Palestine would comprise 45%, and Jerusalem would comprise the other 5%. 40 The Zionists, with reservations, endorsed the plan. However, the Palestinians largely rejected it as inequitable, and violence between the two ensued. The UN plan was never implemented, as a wider war broke out between the Arabs and the Israelis. However, LeT, like other extremist organizations, is a product (or a proxy) but not a producer of conflict.
This incessant dispute is not about prosperity, nor is it about security. The conflict between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir is now and has always been about identity. Like Israel and Palestine, these two adversaries are caught in an identity dilemma. At the root of the conflict, according to Chenoy, are the "contending nationalisms" of Pakistan and India. 61 Pakistan was founded upon the belief that a separate country was necessary because Muslims would be oppressed under a Hindumajority rule. Ceding the Muslim-majority Kashmir to India poses a threat to Pakistan"s foundational identity. 62 Conversely, ceding the Muslim-majority territory to Muslimmajority Pakistan "represents a defeat of India"s secularism." 63 A Georgetown University
Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs case study on Kashmir echoes this assessment: "At the root of the conflict are the nationalist movements of each country and the evolution of these movements since independence." 64 According to Stephen
Cohen, there are two Kashmirs. 65 His assessment is enlightening and, thus, merits reiterating:
Besides the physical territory, another Kashmir is found in the minds of politicians, strategists, soldiers and ideologues. This is a place where national and sub-national identities are ranged against each other. The conflict in this Kashmir is as much a clash between identities, imagination, and history, as it is a conflict over territory, resources and peoples. 66 Shankar Bajpai, too, is convinced the conflict is one of identity. 67 Because identity is at stake, solving the conflict will be difficult, if not impossible, unless perceptions regarding identity change. According to Cohen, "There can be no real peace process between India and Pakistan as long as either retains its identity." 68 These opposing and evolving identities reinforce one another and prolong the dispute. Identity is also a significant factor in the last conflict examined in this essay. Taiwan"s goal increasingly appears to be independence.
China-Taiwan
As Sheila Jager notes, "Taiwan is already a de facto independent state, albeit one without international recognition." 71 Formal recognition of Taiwan"s independence, as she observes, threatens China"s territorial integrity:
A declaration of de jure independence by Taiwan would… constitute a real threat to the territorial integrity of China, since it could invite a dynamic of national disintegration… After all, provinces like Tibet and Xinjiang, with their own distinct ethnicity, language, and culture, have much stronger claims to separate national identity than Taiwan with its majority Han population.
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Yet, in Taiwan, there is a growing sense of a separate Taiwanese identity driving the country"s quest for recognition. 73 This emerging Taiwanese Taiwan"s KMT, led by President Ma, assumed power from the DPP and took a more conciliatory approach toward China. 75 Nevertheless, identity can and does strain the bilateral relationship.
Melissa Brown concludes that "Ultimately the problem is one of identity-Han ethnic Chinese, Chinese national identity, and the relationship of both of these identities to the new Taiwanese identity forged in the 1990s." 76 The budding Taiwanese identity has strengthened, as China has acted to suppress it. 77 Indeed, as Brown notes, China"s threats serve to consolidate Taiwan"s independent identity. 78 What Brown does not offer though is that the reverse is also occurring; Taiwan"s displays of independence serve to strengthen China"s nationalistic goal of reunifying the state. Collective identity is a powerful force. As Bush observes, "the [Taiwanese] leadership sometimes feels constrained by nationalistic pressures from the public." 79 The CFR backgrounder observes that "Since the KMT was elected to power in 2008, President Ma's rapprochement with Beijing has incited pro-independence protests." 80 Today, crossstrait relations between China and Taiwan appear calm on the surface, but because of emerging identity, may one day become violent.
The Consequence of Identity
The three cases examined in the previous section indicate that, over time, identity becomes the most significant of the three motives for continuing a confrontation.
In addition to security and prosperity, the reputation of the state-its people and leaders-is wagered during conflict. The distinct image of self held and projected by the society is at stake. As a result, the conflict becomes firmly associated with self-esteem.
Rhetoric reinforces this association, and as the passions of the populace are enflamed, the flexibility of the leadership becomes constrained.
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Simply stated, the analysis suggests that honor is stronger than fear or interest as a motive for prolonging conflict. Identities in conflict are modified over time in reaction to one another. Each identity threatens the other, and an identity dilemma, similar to a security dilemma, unfolds. The analysis suggests, then, that societies in conflict will eventually endeavor to maintain identity at the expense of security (blood) and prosperity (treasure). The relationship between the three may be depicted as an equilateral triangle with security (S), prosperity (P), and identity (I) residing at the vertices. At the outset of conflict, any of the three motives may be the more significant (or proximate) and, thus, reside at the top. Over time, however, the significance of identity increases and, ultimately, it rises to the apex of the triangle (see Figure below) .
At the outset of conflict, depicted by the first triangle, security may be more significant than prosperity and identity [S>(P=I)]. As time progresses, identity, while not as significant as security, becomes more significant than prosperity (S>I>P). Soon, identity becomes as significant as security and both are more important than prosperity Mitigation. 82 The ICAF draws on existing social science methodologies for analyzing and resolving conflict. The first major task in the ICAF process is to diagnose the conflict.
Step one of the diagnosis is evaluating the context of the conflict.
Step two is understanding the core grievances.
Step three is identifying the drivers of conflict, and step four is describing the prospects for alleviating as well as aggravating the conflict.
The second major task in the analysis is preparing for conflict intervention. 83 Step two of diagnosing the conflict-understanding core grievances-calls for describing the threatened identity groups. According to the ICAF, "Identity groups are inclined to conflict when they perceive that other groups" interests, needs and aspirations compete with and jeopardize their identity, security or other fundamental interests." 84 These threats clearly correspond to the triad of motives for conflict described here. What the ICAF does not do, but this examination advocates, is elevate threats to identity above threats to security or prosperity. The ICAF is a sound process for analyzing conflict. The analysis above suggests, however, that ontological security is more important than physical and fiscal security. Jennifer Mitzen, too, contends that "ontological security-seeking sheds new light on seemingly irrational conflict." 85 Emphasizing identity may enhance the accuracy and efficacy of the ICAF.
The present examination is not alone in advocating the elevation of identity as a catalyst for and cornerstone of conflict. The U.S. Army War College recently developed an "Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy" (ACFSP) to illuminate the cultural dimensions that drive strategic behavior. 86 According to a Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) paper on the ACFSP, these dimensions are identity, political culture, defined as "the structure of power and decision-making," 87 and resilience or "the capacity or ability to resist, adapt, or succumb to external forces." 88 Of the three, the SSI paper contends that identity may, in fact, be the most important driver. 89 Identity, although perhaps unexamined by the contending parties, is often central to the conflict and, thus, integral to a negotiated solution.
In their national bestseller Getting to Yes, Roger Fisher and William Ury encourage negotiators to focus on "interests, not positions" to resolve disputes. 90 These interests are the basic, often unstated concerns behind a given position. 91 James
Sebenius describes these interests as "the underlying concerns of deeper dimensions of value that would be affected by different resolution of the issues under negotiation." 92 However, as George Woods notes in "The Strategic Leader as Negotiator," these concerns are often not consciously examined. 93 Finding a mutually agreeable alternative position becomes possible only when the underlying concerns of the opposing parties become clear. 94 Those seeking negotiated solutions should regard identity, although often unstated, as one of the most important factors in any conflict.
At the root of the world"s most stubborn conflicts, identity dilemmas are found.
Solutions that consider identity (honor) above security (fear) and prosperity (interest) may hold promise for resolving seemingly intractable conflicts. Honorable solutions aim to redress legitimate grievances without diminishing the honor, threatening the identity, or damaging the esteem of the parties involved. Indeed, honorable solutions seek, first and foremost, to bolster honor while addressing fears and interests. Such solutions are not easily devised, but may be entirely necessary to defuse mankind"s most dangerous disputes.
Taking the Triad Further
A single line in a serendipitous speech delivered on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, over two thousand years ago, succinctly articulates the primary motives for human conflict. In the line, the three major forces-physical, material, and social-that influence individual and collective behavior are articulated. In the line, the three major paradigms of international relations theory are represented: realism through fear, liberalism through interest, and constructivism through honor. In Leviathan, Hobbes labeled the three motives explored here as competition, diffidence, and glory. According to Hobbes, "The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation." 95 These motives may be constants, but their relative weight is influenced by culture.
Cultural values shape how societies perceive themselves, others, and their environment. These values influence how members of a society think and act. Profound cultural awareness facilitates comprehending the relationship between security, prosperity, and identity within a society. These three motives compel states, as constructs of man, to compete and, thus, to conflict. Identity, as argued here, often outweighs both security and prosperity as a motive, and so should be given greater emphasis in analyzing and resolving conflict. Determining the relative importance of the latter two motives would add merit to this basic premise. Establishing the relationship between the motives offers a method for classifying the collective identity, and, perhaps, for accurately extrapolating the strategic behavior of the state. However, doing so requires a more extensive exploration of the cultures in conflict than undertaken in this initial endeavor. Such strategic identity typologies, while not exhaustive, impart broader explanatory power to the triad and, though beyond the scope of the present examination, warrant further consideration.
Endnotes
